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Summary
This is a joint review, written for the Journal of
Eaonomia Literature , of tv70 recent books by Blinder
and Eckstein on the Great Stagflation. The review
compares the approaches, the theory bases, and the
policy conclusions of the two books and examines the
extent to which the policy conclusions reflect the
theory bases.

Eoonomia Policy and the Great Stagflation. By
ALAN S. BLINDER. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney,
and San Francisco: Academic Press, 1979, Pp , xiii,
229.
The Great Recession, With a Postscript on Stag-
flation. By OTTO ECKSTEIN. Data Resources Series,
Vol. 3. Amsterdam, New York, and Oxford: North
Holland Publishing Co., 1978, Pp. ii, 213.
These two eminently readable books were published
almost simultaneously and deal with the same subject,
the 1972-1977 cycle. Successful historiography must
be factual as well as counterfactual , and both books are
successful. Blinder writes with color and verve.
- 2 -
using intuition, ad hoc econometrics, or the full
MIT-Penn-SSRC model as he sees fit. Eckstein writes
austerely, using a single model throughout, his Data
Resources model programmed to simulate the eight hist-
ories of the real gross national product and the rates
of inflation, interest, and unemployment as they would
have unfolded if there had been no war, if the war had
been financed by higher income taxes, if there had
been no price and wage controls, if a full-employment
balanced budget had prevailed, if bank reserves had
been growing smoothly and moderately, if the rate of
interest had never exceeded 5 per cent, and if
food or oil price growth had never exceeded 3 and
5 per cent per annum, respectively. The very success
of the Data Resources model in predicting what did
happen lends credence to its simulation of what did
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not happen and to its finding that the food and oil
shocks contributed 2.8 percentage points to the 1975
unemployment rate of 8.5 and 3.2 percentage points
to the 1974- inflation rate of 10.3. Here is modern
quantitative economics at its best!
What are the theory bases and the policy conclu-
sions of the two books? To what extent do the policy
conclusions reflect the theory bases?
Eckstein offers no succinct statement of his
theory basis ^perhaps none is feasible. He does
offer a most readable twenty-two page overview of the
economic content of three generations of large-scale
macroeconomic computer models.
Blinder' Chapter 2 offers a succinct statement
of his theory basis under the Einstein motto that
everything should be made as simple as possible, but
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not more so. Diagrams of static aggregate demand and
supply curves show that whereas an upward shift of
the demand curve will raise both price and output, an
upward shift of the supply curve will raise price but
reduce output. It is concluded that the supply shift
fits the Great Stagflation better than does the demand
shift.
V/ould Einstein have thought of this as being
simpler than possible? Blinder is always shifting
one curve while leaving the other in place. If,
like Marshall's plasterers, a trade or industry is
small, its demand and supply curves can be indepen-
dent. But aggregate ones cannot be, consequently
the economy cannot do what it does in- Blinder's dia-
gram: end up in the intersection point between a
new supply curve and the old demand curve.
Next, Einstein might have observed, it is one
thing to tell how high price will be, quite a dif-
ferent thing to tell how rapidly it will be chan-
ging. Shifting static curves is an arbitrary act
of the investigator is exogenous and one-shot.
Exactly what we need!, Blinder would say, emphasizing
his distinction between an exogenous one-shot infla-
tion, caused by energy or food shocks, and sustained
inflation, caused by excessive growth of the money
supply. The distinction is used to pass
.
judgment on
the performance of economic theory in the 'seventies
and allows Blinder to "drive the final nails into the
coffin" of the monetarist model: Its simulation
misses the energy, food, and decontrol shocks. Key-
nesian models fare better: "...it was not the adhe-
rence to 'Keynesian' policies that got us in trouble
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in the 1970s." Two pages earlier, however, Blin-
der does take the public debate to task for hav-
ing ignored the supply side. Are Keynesians really
less guilty than monetarists of having taught the
public to ignore the supply side?
Einstein might have been pleased, had Blinder
softened his supply-side statics into a supply-side
dynamics. Less than the 900 equations of the Data
Resources model might do. For a quarter century we
have possessed a simple and powerful piece of supply
-side dynamics, Solow's (1956) neoclassical growth
model. Unemployment, a Phillips curve, and natural
resources could be put into it [Brems (1980)] and
would show the rate of inflation to be the higher,
the more rapidly natural resources are dwindling.
Blinder and Eckstein draw quite different policy
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conclusions and do it with quite different biases
of optimism. Towards the end of his book. Blinder
tells three histories of 1971-1975. The first is
the actual one; the second is what might have happen-
ed under a hands-off economic policy; the third is
what might have happened under an economic policy
to Blinder's liking.
In 1972 a wise economic policy would have been a
hands-off policy rather than the heavy monetary and
fiscal stimulus under price and wage controls actually
pursued. In 1974- the actual policy was a hands-off
policy: It failed to accommodate the food and oil
shocks and even added a shock of its own, i. e., the
decontrol shock. Blinder's neat distinction between
one-shot and sustained inflation allows him to think
optimistically of the supply shocks as one-shot
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events which the Ford administration should have
"accommodated" by one-shot monetary and fiscal sti-
muli.
But were the supply shocks one-shot events?
At the end of his book Blinder looks at the next
stagflation, that of 1977-1979, and observes that
the new food and oil shocks were almost exact pa-
rallels to the old ones. If so, v:e would have had
four major supply shocks within a seven-year period
on an average one every twenty-two months !
If such supply shocks are perceived as part of a
regular pattern emerging in a new, smaller, and more
dangerous world, Ford-Carter nonaccommodation becomes
more understandable.
Nonaccommodation is indeed one of Eckstein's
two Drastic Approaches to end stagflation. Let us
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take a closer look at them. Use Solow (1956) and Eck-
stein (1978) notation: g = growth rate; K = capital
stock; L = employment; p = price; u = unemployment
rate; w = money wage rate; Y = output. Let A be a
growing parameter, a, fj and (J stationary ones. Find
a price equation by assuming a production function Y -
AK L ~ . Profit-maximizing firms will then hire labor
until the real wage rate equals the marginal producti-
vity of labor: u/p = (1 - a)Y/L or p = wL/Llil - a)],
in other words, until price exceeds per-unit labor cost
in the proportion 1/(1 - a). Now differentiate logarith-
mically and find the price equation ff-n ' du ~ 3(Y/L)'
The rate of growth of price equals the rate of growth
of the money wage rate minus the rate of growth of labor
productivity. The wage equation is easier, it is simply
a Phillips function incorporating labor's inflationary
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expectations : g = f/u + <^g . Does a price-wage equi-
librium exist? Is there a set of solutions ia 3 a ,)
p w
which, if expected, will come true and satisfy both the
price and the wage equation? There is
:
(1)
(2)
which are mathematically meaningful if (J) > I and eco-
nomically meaningful in the sense of yielding. a stable
equilibrium if (j) < 1.
The first one of Eckstein's Drastic Approaches is
three to four years of rigid price and wage controls,
tantamount to suppressing our equilibrium solutions
(1) and (2) for a time. This will, in Eckstein's words,
"accomplish the change in price expectations that is
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necessary." Will it? How can the new expecta-
tions thus accomplished come true and at the same
time satisfy both the price and the wage equati-
on? If, given the unemployment rate u, productivity
growth g,y.^, and the structural parameters / and
<|) of the Phillips function, solutions (1) and (2)
are unique, then how can price-and-wage-control va-
lues of g and g prevail once controls are lifted?
Eckstein's own simulation (pp. 54-59) and that of
Blinder (pp. 126-129) agree that they did not pre-
vail: by the second half of 1974 the benefits of
controls were lost.
Now for Eckstein's version of nonaccommodation
.
His second Drastic Approach is five to seven years of
unemployment and is tantamount to adhering to equilibrium
solutions (1) and (2) while maintaining a high value of u.
- 12 -
This is called "the other feasible strategy for ending
stagflation." But how can it be? According to soluti-
ons (1) and (2) will not g and g return to normal once
u does? Elsewhere in the volume Eckstein agrees that
they will: "The American economy does not possess a
Phillips curve which reconciles reasonable full employ-
ment with reasonable price stability." (p. 14-2). Else-
where, Eckstein-Girola (1978, 332) were numerically
specific: "Deriving the Phillips curve from the postwar
record 194-7-77 the unemployment i^equired for perfect
price stability seems to have risen to about 7*/2%, while
the point where it becomes nearly vertical has remained
near 4% . " Unlike Blinder's optimistic bias, that of
Eckstein is present only in his conclusions, not in
his premises.
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